Civil Procedure: An Active Term for the Seventh Circuit by Chidichimo, Rose Marie et al.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 3 Article 6
October 1986
Civil Procedure: An Active Term for the Seventh
Circuit
Rose Marie Chidichimo
Douglas Lohmar
Renita Sterling
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rose M. Chidichimo, Douglas Lohmar & Renita Sterling, Civil Procedure: An Active Term for the Seventh Circuit , 62 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
467 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol62/iss3/6
CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN ACTIVE TERM
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
ROSE MARIE CHIDICHIMO*
DOUGLAS LOHMAR**
RENITA STERLING***
During its 1983-84 term, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided a number of cases dealing with issues of federal
civil procedure. This article reviews most of those cases. The cases have
been classified under the following headings: personal jurisdiction, re-
moval, venue, appellate jurisdiction, preliminary injunctions, inter-
pleader jurisdiction, attorney's fees and sanctions.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Due process requires that a defendant establish "minimum con-
tacts" with a forum before that forum can exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.' The court's analysis for sufficiency of contacts in-
cludes an examination of whether the defendant's conduct, in connection
with the forum, was such that he could reasonably anticipate being sued
in that forum. 2 The due process requirement is satisfied if the defendant
has purposefully directed his activities at a plaintiff in the forum. 3 In the
1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit closely examined the defendant's con-
duct to determine whether he had established sufficient contacts in the
forum for jurisdiction. The court concluded that a nonresident defend-
ant who actively seeks business in the forum will be amenable to suit
there.4 On the contrary, a defendant who has not knowingly sought the
privilege of doing business in the forum cannot be forced to defend
there.5
* B.A., University of Chicago; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1987.
B.A., University of Minnesota; Candidate for J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
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1. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
2. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
3. Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
4. Madison Consulting Group v. South Carolina, 752 F.2d 1193, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) (herein-
after referred to as "MCG").
5. Hall's Specialties, Inc. v. Schupbach, 758 F.2d 214, 216-17 (7th Cir. 1985).
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In Madison Consulting Group ("MCG") v. South Carolina,6 the Sev-
enth Circuit found the contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant whose sole contact with the forum was the dis-
puted contract with the plaintiff. The court based its decision on the fact
that the defendant had initiated the contact with the forum plaintiff.7
Thus, the defendant had knowingly sought the privilege of doing busi-
ness in the forum.
The court determined that the South Carolina defendant's act of
phoning the Wisconsin plaintiff at its home office to discuss a service
contract established the contact with the forum. This initial contact led
to several meetings between the parties, none of which was in Wiscon-
sin.8 The parties eventually contracted for MCG to prepare a study and
report on economic issues concerning a dam in South Carolina.
Although the contract did not specify a place of performance, the court
held the defendant to understand that most of the work would be done at
plaintiff's place of business in Wisconsin. 9 The plaintiff brought suit in
Wisconsin for payment under the contract which was defendant's only
contact with the forum.10
The Seventh Circuit, as well as the district court, applied an earlier
Seventh Circuit decision, Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State
Construction Co. I, While the district court, in applying Lakeside, held
that there was jurisdiction over the MCG defendant, the Seventh Circuit
reversed holding that Lakeside was distinguishable.1 2 In Lakeside, a
West Virginia defendant ordered goods from a Wisconsin plaintiff.
Although the defendant had knowledge that the goods would be manu-
factured and shipped from Wisconsin, this act was insufficient to estab-
lish "minimum contacts" with the forum.' 3 Lakeside relied on the
Supreme Court's Hanson v. Denckla 14 standard, which requires that the
defendant "purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activi-
ties within the forum, thus invoking the benefits and protection of the
6. 752 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1985).
7. Id. at 1202.
8. Id. at 1194. The defendant paid the travel expenses incurred by MCG in attending the
meetings. The contract was eventually executed through the mail. Id. at 1194-95.
9. Id. at 1195. Since it was a "time is of the essence" contract, the defendant was held to
understand that the plaintiff would be required to do most of the work in Wisconsin in order to finish
the report by the contracted date. 85% of the work was actually performed in Wisconsin. Id.
10. Id.
11. 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980).
12. MCG, 752 F.2d at 1201. Personal jurisdiction under Wisconsin's long arm statute was not
at issue. The only issue was whether jurisdiction was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1195.
13. Lakeside Bridge, 597 F.2d at 603. See also MCG, 752 F.2d at 1196.
14. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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law."' 5 The Seventh Circuit held that the Lakeside defendant who had
merely ordered goods from a forum plaintiff had not purposefully availed
itself of the forum, and was thus not amenable to suit there.
Applying Lakeside to MCG, the district court compared the MCG
defendant's act of solicitation of the plaintiff's services to the Lakeside
defendant's act of ordering goods. The Lakeside defendant had not pur-
posefully availed itself of the laws and benefits of the forum by ordering
goods. Furthermore, the MCG defendant had not purposefully availed
itself of the laws and benefits of the forum by soliciting services. There-
fore, the district court concluded that jurisdiction was not constitution-
ally permissible.1 6
In reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that while
Lakeside was relevant, MCG was distinguishable. The court found the
distinction in the fact that the Lakeside defendant had ordered goods
from a plaintiff who had travelled to the defendant's place of business to
offer those goods. On the contrary, the MCG defendant had initiated the
contact with the forum plaintiff by phoning him in the forum. The court
reasoned that the MCG defendant had actively reached into the forum to
solicit the plaintiff's services, which it knew would be performed in the
forum. Accordingly, unlike the Lakeside defendant,17 the MCG defend-
ant had purposefully availed itself of the forum by establishing contacts,
which "easily satisfy the dictates of constitutional due process."' 8
The concurring opinion failed to find any significant distinction be-
tween Lakeside and MCG, and consequently would have overruled Lake-
side.'9 This opinion reasoned that jurisdiction should not turn on the
relative agressiveness of the defendant. 20 Instead, the performance of the
disputed contract in the forum, when the defendant reasonably contem-
plated that it would be performed there, gives the forum jurisdiction over
a dispute arising from that contract. 2 '
In a later case, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant who had
placed an advertisement in an Illinois journal which was later reprinted
15. Id. at 253.
16. MCG, 752 F.2d at 1202.
17. In Jacobs/Kahan & Co. v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1984) (decided this term prior to
MCG), the Seventh Circuit held jurisdiction was proper over a California defendant who had con-
tracted for an Illinois plaintiff's services. Id. at 593. The court found that the defendant, who had
executed the contract in the plaintiff's Illinois offices after inspecting the plaintiff's business opera-
tions, had established "minimum contacts" with the forum. Id. at 592. The defendant, in opposing
jurisdiction, had relied on Lakeside. Id.
18. MCG, 752 F.2d at 1203.
19. Id. at 1210 (Swygert, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 1206 (Swygert, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 1210 (Swygert, J., concurring).
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in an Indiana journal, had not knowingly solicited business in Indiana.
The defendant's act of placing the advertisement was insufficient to es-
tablish "minimum contacts." In Hall's Specialties v. Schupback2 2 the
Illinois defendant had placed an advertisement in the "Illinois Prairie
Farmer." Without defendant's knowledge the advertisement was also
printed in the "Indiana Prairie Farmer." The Indiana plaintiff, after
reading the advertisement in the Indiana journal, purchased an allegedly
defective tanker from the defendant. The issue was whether Indiana had
jurisdiction over the Illinois defendant whose only contact with the fo-
rum was the advertisement.
Based on an analysis of the MCG opinion, the Seventh Circuit held
that the defendant's act in placing the advertisement in the Illinois jour-
nal was insufficient for personal jurisdiction in Indiana. The defendant
had not knowingly solicited the sale in Indiana and, therefore, would not
have anticipated being sued there.23 On these facts, the court determined
that the defendant had not acted with the intent of soliciting the forum
plaintiff's business. Consequently, he had not acted to invoke the bene-
fits and privileges of the laws of the forum and was not amenable to suit
there.24
Judge Flaum, who had written the very thorough analysis of the
"minimum contacts" standard in the majority opinion in MCG, dis-
sented in Hall's.25 His dissenting opinion pointed out that this particular
Illinois defendant had previously sold a tanker to this same Indiana
plaintiff through a similar advertisement in the same Illinois journal.
The defendant knew that his advertisement would be read in Indiana.
Thus, the dissent concluded, the defendant had knowingly sought busi-
ness in Indiana. Consequently, the dissent would hold that Indiana did
have jurisdiction over this Illinois defendant. 26
The Seventh Circuit analysis, in these cases, is in line with a recent
Supreme Court case. Several months after the Seventh Circuit handed
down the opinions discussed above, the Supreme Court held that Florida
had jurisdiction over a Michigan defendant whose sole contact with the
forum was a disputed contract with a forum plaintiff. In Burger King v.
22. 758 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1985). Judge Evans, writing for the majority, opined that Judge
Wapner of "People's Court" fame would not last long on television if he dealt with the rather dull
legal issues raised by personal jurisdiction cases. "The greater sin than dullness, however, is the
confusing and contradictory body of law that has developed." Id. at 215.
23. Id. at 216-17.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 217 (Flaum, J., dissenting). Judge Flaum's dissent evidences that the "minimum
contacts" definition is still very much at issue, notwithstanding the very extensive analysis in the
MCG opinion.
26. Hall's Specialties, 758 F.2d at 217-18.
470
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Rudzewicz, 27 the Court found that the defendant had known the contract
was with a Florida plaintiff, although he argued that he had contracted
with a Michigan representative of the plaintiff. The court reasoned that
the contract at issue provided that Florida law govern the relationship
and that the defendant send all payments under the contract to Florida.
The defendant knew that the Florida headquarters regulated the contrac-
tual relationship. The defendant's conduct was such that he could rea-
sonably anticipate being compelled to defend in Florida.28 Thus, the
exercise of jurisdiction by Florida over this nonresident defendant did
not violate the requirements of due process.
The Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit continue to wrestle
with the due process requirements for personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant whose sole contact with the forum is the disputed
contract with the forum plaintiff. However, it is clear that a party who
purposefully reaches beyond one state and creates obligations with the
citizens of another state, in a manner which makes it foreseeable that he
might be subject to suit in that foreign state, cannot evade the foreign
state's exercise of jurisdiction. 29 In Burger King, the Supreme Court
stated, "The Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territo-
rial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily as-
sumed. ' ' 30 A defendant who actively seeks the privilege of doing business
with a forum plaintiff will be subject to suit in that forum.3'
REMOVAL
The removal statute32 generally provides that the defendant may re-
move any action in which the federal courts had "original jurisdiction."
The statute also provides that where a "separate and independent" cause
of action, which is removable, is joined with a nonremovable cause of
action, the defendant may remove the entire case.33 During the 1984-85
27. 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985).
28. Id. at 2190.
29. Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950).
30. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2183.
31. Id. at 2190.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982):
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State Court of which the district courts of the United States have original juris-
diction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action
is pending.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982):
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which could be re-
movable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise nonremovable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
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term, the Seventh Circuit decided several issues surrounding the terms
"original jurisdiction" and "separate and independent."
1. "Original Jurisdiction"
Federal courts have "original jurisdiction" only over causes of ac-
tion arising under federal law 34 and over disputes between citizens of
different states.35 The Seventh Circuit interpreted the "arising under fed-
eral law" extent of its jurisdiction in two cases this term. In both cases,
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange had removed actions to federal court
contending that federal law governed the plaintiffs' rights under the rules
of the Exchange.
In the earlier case, Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co. 36 the Seventh
Circuit held that although the Commodities Exchange Act 37 closely reg-
ulates the Exchange, federal law does not govern all disputes between the
Exchange and its members. 38 In its determination of whether federal law
governed the action, the court examined the dispute between the parties.
The dispute began when Bernstein rented his seat on the Exchange to
Caan, who because of trading losses owed a large sum of money to Lind-
Waldock. Pursuant to the rules of the Exchange, Lind-Waldock re-
quested an auction of Bernstein's seat. Bernstein then brought suit in
state court against Lind-Waldock and the Exchange to enjoin the sale of
his seat.39 The defendants removed, contending that federal law gov-
erned Bernstein's rights under the rules of the Exchange. Preferring to
remain in state court, Bernstein moved to remand. When the district
court denied his motion, Bernstein amended his complaint against the
Exchange, charging that the Exchange had taken his seat without due
process of law.
The Seventh Circuit held that federal law did not govern Bernstein's
original complaint. The court reasoned that state contract law rather
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not other-
wise within its original jurisdiction.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States."
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982).
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between-
(1) citizens of different States.
36. 738 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1984).
37. 7 U.S.C. §§ I et. seq. (1982).
38. Bernstein, 758 F.2d at 184.
39. Id. at 181. The suit became one for restoration of Bernstein's seat on the Exchange, or for
damages, when the district court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 182.
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than any federal statute governed the action.4° The internal rules of a
federally regulated stock exchange do not create rights of action under
federal law.4 1 Accordingly, the federal court did not have "original juris-
diction" over Bernstein's original complaint, and at that time neither
party could properly remove. However, federal law did govern Bern-
stein's amended complaint against the Exchange. When the district
court refused to remand, Bernstein amended his complaint adding the
unmistakably federal claim of lack of due process. Consequently, the
Seventh Circuit concluded the district court had "original jurisdiction"
over Bernstein's amended complaint and removal by the Exchange was
proper.42 Removal by Lind-Waldock, however, was improper.
The plaintiff in Korach v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,43 also
charged that the defendant had violated his due process rights. 44 The
plaintiff alleged that the International Monetary Market Division of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange had wrongly denied him membership. Al-
legedly, the Exchange had not given the plaintiff's application the fair
and equitable consideration required by due process. The Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the Commodity Exchange Act 45 had pre-empted the area
of the Exchange's rules which regulate membership in the Exchange or
any of its divisions.46 Thus, the court decided that unlike Bernstein, a
federal statute governed this plaintiff's rights under the rules of the Ex-
change.47 Consequently, the federal courts had "original jurisdiction"
over the action, and the Exchange had properly removed.
2. "Separate and Independent"
The removal statute provides that where a removable cause of action
is joined with a "separate and independent" nonremovable cause of ac-
tion, the defendant may remove the entire case. The district court in its
discretion may then hear the entire case or may remand the nonremov-
able action to state court.48 In the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit
40. Id. at 184-85.
41. Id. at 185.
42. Id.
43. 747 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 415. The court did not discuss Bernstein.
45. 7 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1982).
46. Korach, 747 F.2d at 416. The court does not analyze its pre-emption ruling. The Commod-
ity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 12(c)(2), provides for review of an exchange's denial of membership by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). The Act further provides procedures for
judicial review of the CFTC decision. Id.
47. Id. at 415.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982). For the pertinent text of the statute, see supra note 33.
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decided two cases involving the "separate and independent" provision of
the statute.
A. Removal by Third Party Defendants49
Issues arising under the "separate and independent" section of the
removal statute usually center on what can be removed. This term, the
Seventh Circuit confronted the issue of who can remove the entire case.
Treating this issue as one of first impression, the court decided that the
removal statute does not authorize a third party defendant's removal of
the entire case. This is contrary to the Fifth Circuit which has permitted
such removals. 50 The Seventh Circuit decision, however, is in accord
with the commentators who have concluded that third party defendants
may never remove.
5 1
In the Seventh Circuit decision, Thomas v. Shelton,52 the plaintiff,
aged eleven, injured himself on farm machinery located on land his fam-
ily rented from the Sheltons. Because Thomas' father was a member of
the armed forces, the United States paid the medical expenses resulting
from the injury. Both Thomas and the United States brought suit against
the Sheltons. Thomas brought suit in state court on a tort theory, while
the United States brought suit in federal court under the Medical Recov-
ery Act.5 3 The Sheltons, fearing double liability for the medical ex-
penses, impleaded the United States in Thomas' state court action,
making the United States a third party defendant. The United States
then removed the entire state action to the federal district court where its
suit against the defendants was pending. Thus, Thomas v. Shelton
presented a case where a third party defendant had removed the entire
action.
In analyzing whether removal of the entire case was proper, the
court first examined the United States' claim. The threshold issue under
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (in pertinent part):
At any time after commencement of the action, a defending party, as a third party plaintiff,
may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
50. See Carl Heck Eng'r, Inc. v. LaFourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135-36 (5th Cir.
1980).
51. See IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.163(4.-6) (2d ed. 1983); 14 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3724 at 643-45 (1983 Supp.).
52. 740 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1984).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1982) (in pertinent part):
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required by law to furnish hospital,
medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment ... to a person who is injured or suffers a
disease... under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person... to pay
damages thereof, the United States shall have a right to recover from said third person the
reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished....
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this section of the statute is whether the "separate and independent"
cause of action is removable. Here, the United States' claim was founded
on a federal statute, and thus was within the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the United
States had properly removed its claim. 54
The issue then was whether the United States had properly removed
Thomas' nonremovable claim along with its own. For proper removal,
the nonremovable claim must be "separate and independent" of the re-
movable claim. Here, however, the United States' claim was not separate
from the plaintiff's tort claim. The federal claim was "parasitic" in that
if Thomas' claim failed so would that of the United States.55 Claims are
not "separate and independent" if they arise from the same loss or ac-
tionable wrong.5 6 In both Thomas' claim and the United States' claim,
the defendants' fault was at issue. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that the removable claim was not joined with a "separate and independ-
ent" claim as the statute requires. The Seventh Circuit held that the
district court was required to remand Thomas' tort claim to state court,
while keeping the United States' claim. The United States could not
probably remove the entire action. 57
The Seventh Circuit further reached the issue of whether third party
defendants could ever remove. The court noted that third party com-
plaints are, by nature, dependent on the success of the main claim. 58
Therefore third party claims could not be "separate and independent" of
the main claim. The Seventh Circuit determined that allowing third
party defendants to remove an entire case would expand the original ju-
risdiction of the federal judiciary. 59 The court reasoned that the federal
judiciary did not have original jurisdiction over the main issue. How-
ever, defendant's impleader of the third party would permit the federal
court to hear that non-federal issue. The Seventh Circuit refused to al-
low removal of an entire action based on a third party claim. Although
the court refused to adopt a universal rule that third party defendants
can never remove, there was a strong inference that this will be the rule
in the Seventh Circuit. 60
The concurring opinion agreed that in Thomas v. Shelton the nonre-
movable claim was not "separate and independent" of the removable
54. 740 F.2d at 482.
55. Id. at 486.
56. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14-16 (1951).
57. Thomas, 740 F.2d at 488.
58. Id. at 486. The court pointed out that most third party claims are for indemnity. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 487.
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claim. Therefore, removal of the entire action by the third party defend-
ant was not proper. However, this opinion disagreed with the inference
that third party defendants may never remove. 61 Third party defendants
may properly remove when the removable and nonremovable claims are
"separate and independent." Thomas v. Shelton did not provide the
proper circumstances for removal of the entire case by a third party
defendant. 62
B. Timeliness of the Removal
In Lewis v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,63 the Seventh Circuit
held that the defendant had failed to remove within the thirty day period
allowed by the statute.64 The issue before the court was the determina-
tion of when the thirty day period began. The plaintiff claimed that the
period began when the defendant received the amended complaint which
contained a removable claim. The defendant argued that due to the unu-
sual nature of the plaintiff's claims, the period did not begin until after a
state jury rendered a decision on the nonremovable allegations.
Plaintiff-employee brought his original complaint under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") 5 in state court. Although the par-
ties were diverse, defendant-employer could not remove the claim be-
cause FELA complaints are not removable. 66  The plaintiff later
amended 67 his complaint to include an allegation that the defendant had
harrassed him in retaliation for filing the FELA claim. The defendant
did not remove the harrassment charge, and the state court tried the en-
tire action. The jury awarded the plaintiff damages on the FELA charge,
but could not reach a verdict on the harassment charge. After the jury
61. Id. at 489-90 (Swygert, J., concurring). See supra note 60 and accompanying text. For a
compilation of district court decisions and a thorough analysis of when third party defendants can
properly remove, see Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1108,
1110 nn. 6 and 8 (N.D. III. 1983).
62. Thomas, 740 F.2d at 491.
63. 758 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1985).
64. Lewis, 758 F.2d at 222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982):
(b) The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty
days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding
is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such
initial pleading has then not been filed in court and is not required to be served on the
defendant, whichever period is shorter.
65. Lewis, 758 F.2d at 220. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1982).
66. Lewis, 758 F.2d at 220. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982).
(a) A civil action in any state court against a railroad or its receivers or trustees, arising
under sections 51-60 of Title 45 (Federal Employers' Liability Act), may not be re-
moved to any district court in the United States.
67. Lewis, 758 F.2d at 220. The complaint was amended a total of five times. The first amend-
ment contained the harrassment charge. Id.
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had rendered its decision, the defendant moved to remove the harrass-
ment charge.
Plaintiff argued that the defendant had been required to remove the
harassment charge within thirty days of receiving it. Consequently, de-
fendant could not remove now. The defendant responded that the har-
rassment charge was not "separate and independent" of the
nonremovable FELA count until the jury decision severed the two
claims. Therefore, the defendant reasoned it had thirty days after the
jury decision in which to remove.
The Seventh Circuit determined that the case turned on whether the
harrassment charge was "separate and independent" of the FELA claim.
If the claims were separate, the statute required the defendant to have
removed within thirty days of receipt of the amended complaint, and
removal now was untimely. If, however, the claims were inseparable, the
defendant could not properly have removed the harrassment charge
earlier.
The court held that the harrassment claim was independent of the
FELA claim because the two claims did not involve substantially the
same facts.68 The court reasoned that the FELA claim centered on the
defendant's conduct up to the date of the plaintiff's FELA injury, while
the harrassment charge concerned the defendant's conduct after the
FELA charge was filed. Therefore, the court concluded that the harrass-
ment claim alleged a different wrong based on a different set of facts.
Consequently, the harrassment claim was "separate and independent" of
the FELA claim, and defendant could only have removed within thirty
days of receiving the amended complaint. 69
VENUE
7 0
1. Choice of Law
Choice of law rules in the area of venue are designed to prevent
forum shopping for substantive law by either the defendant or the plain-
tiff. The Van Dusen rule71 provides that when a defendant successfully
moves to transfer a diversity action from one district to another on venue
grounds, the transferee court must apply the substantive law of the origi-
68. Id. at 221-22.
69. Id. at 222.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). "(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."
71. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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nal forum. In Gonzalez v. Volvo of America Corp. ,72 the Seventh Circuit
expanded the Van Dusen rule. Previously the rule had applied only to
transfers initiated by the defendant. Gonzalez expanded the rule to trans-
fers initiated by the plaintiff.73 Accordingly, when either the defendant
or the plaintiff successfully moves to transfer on venue grounds, the new
forum must apply the substantive law of the original forum. This rule is
designed to prevent either party from utilizing a venue transfer to avoid
the application of the law of the original forum.74
An exception to the Van Dusen rule provides that, where personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was lacking in the original forum, the
transferee court must apply the substantive law of the state in which it
sits. This exception applies whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant
who initiates the transfer. The exception prevents the plaintiff from
bringing suit in a state where there is no personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in order to bring that forum's law with the action when it is
transferred. 75
2. Forum Selection Clauses in Arbitration Contracts
Snyder v. Smith 76 presented a conflict between the provisions of the
Federal Arbitration Act 77 and the terms of an arbitration agreement be-
tween the parties. The Seventh Circuit determined that where such a
conflict exists, the district court must dismiss the action. The court first
examined the Federal Arbitration Act. The Act provides that, where a
party has petitioned the court for an order directing that arbitration pro-
ceed, the district court shall order such arbitration in the district in
which the petition is filed. In Snyder, the plaintiff filed a petition for an
order compelling arbitration with the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. Accordingly, the statute empowered
72. 734 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984). The court, in this opinion, also discussed whether the mis-
conduct of plaintiff's counsel during closing arguments is grounds for a new trial. Id. at 1225-26.
73. Id. at 1224.
74. Id. at 1223-24.
75. The Sixth and the Eleventh Circuits agree with this interpretation of the Van Dusen rule.
See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1980); Roofing & Sheet Metal Serv., Inc. v. La
Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 991-93 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
76. 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984).
77. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) which states in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action . . . for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agree-
ment.... (T)he court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings under such
agreement shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbi-
tration is filed. (emphasis added).
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the district court to order arbitration only in its own district in Illinois.
However, the arbitration agreement between the parties provided for ar-
bitration in Houston, Texas.78 Faced with this conflict, the district court
correctly concluded that it did not have the power to order arbitration in
Texas as called for in the parties' agreement. The court, however, did
order arbitration in Illinois.
In reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that the
court must give effect to forum selection clauses worked out between the
parties in arms-length negotiations. 79 Therefore, the court must order
the parties to arbitrate in accordance with their agreement. Here, the
parties' agreement called for arbitration in Texas. Since the district court
lacked the power to order arbitration in Texas, the correct procedure was
dismissal.80 Dismissal of the petition in Illinois would cause the party
seeking the order compelling arbitration to petition the district court
named in its agreement for such an order.81
3. Venue for Disputes Over Real Property
Raphael J Musicus, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 8 2 presented techni-
cal issues involving the characterization of actions as local or transitory
for venue purposes. In local actions, the plaintiff seeks in rem relief
which directly affects the property in question. Proper venue in such
actions lies only in the district in which the property is located. In tran-
sitory actions, on the other hand, the plaintiff seeks in personam relief, so
that the court acts on the person or personal property of the defendant
and only indirectly on the land involved. Proper venue for transitory
action lies wherever there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 83
In the instant case, the plaintiff brought suit in Illinois over proper-
ties he owned in Montana and Nebraska. The plaintiff sued for breaches
of the leases on the properties and also for willful trespass and unlawful
78. Snyder, 736 F.2d at 412-13. The agreement at issue provided in relevant part:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement, or to the interpreta-
tion, breach or enforcement thereof, shall be submitted to three arbitrators and settled by
arbitration in the City of Houston, Texas....
Id.
79. Id. at 419. The dissent interprets the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4, to refer to
terms of the parties' agreement other than forum selection, thereby avoiding any conflict. Snyder at
420 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 420. No other circuit has considered this issue in the same posture as this case
presents. For a discussion of other circuits' handling of the conflict in different circumstances, see
Snyder, 736 F.2d at 418 n.7.
81. Id. at 420.
82. 743 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1984). This case demonstrates that the arcane distinction between
local and transitory actions for venue purposes is not obsolete.
83. Id. at 505-06.
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detainer. The district court determined that the plaintiff sought to re-
cover possession of the properties. Since the relief would act directly on
the properties, the district court decided that the action was in rem.
Consequently, the court concluded that proper venue would lie only in
the district in which each property was located; therefore, the district
court dismissed the action.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the main issue was the
breach of the leases. An action for damages founded in contract law is
traditionally characterized as transitory.8 4 Consequently, proper venue
for the breaches of the leases would lie wherever there is personal juris-
diction over the defendant.
However, the trespass and willful detainer charges were best charac-
terized as local. The court reasoned that these actions directly affected
the properties involved, and therefore were in rem actions. Proper venue
for these actions would lie only in the district in which each property was
located. However, in the instant case, no purpose would be served by
adjudicating each of these actions separately. The court concluded that
the main issue was the breach of the leases between the same parties and
properties. Accordingly, proper venue for the entire action would lie in
any district that had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 85
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
1. "Final Decisions"
The appellate jurisdiction statute8 6 provides for jurisdiction over "fi-
nal decisions" of the district court. Most cases arising under this statute
involve construction of the term "final decisions."
In Gilles v. Burton Construction Co.,87 the Seventh Circuit held that
when the district court refused to enter a judgment, no "final decision"
had been reached. The plaintiff brought suit under section 502 of the
Employee Retirement Income Act of 1974 ("ERISA").88 The complaint
charged that the defendant-employer was delinquent in its contributions
to an employee retirement fund.8 9 Shortly after receiving the complaint,
84. Id. at 507.
85. Id. at 511.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (in pertinent part):
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the dis-
trict courts of the United States....
87. 736 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1984).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982).
89. Gilles, 736 F.2d at 1143. See 29 U.S.C. § 1145 (1982):
Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the
terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the
480
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the defendant tendered an amount to the plaintiff which included the
amount of the overdue contributions, cost of an audit, and a penalty for
the late contributions. The plaintiff, dissatisfied because the tendered
amount did not include attorney's fees, turned to the district court seek-
ing a judgment in its favor. The issuance of a judgment in the plaintiff's
favor would invoke the mandatory relief provisions of ERISA which pro-
vide that a delinquent contributor pay reasonable costs and attorney's
fees.90
The district court refused to enter a judgment, but did award attor-
ney's fees. That court reasoned that because the defendant had already
tendered the amount the plaintiff was demanding for late contributions,
there was no need to enter a judgment. Plaintiff appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, contending that the district court had erred in refusing to enter a
judgment and also that the attorney's fees award was insufficient.
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court had not reached a
"final decision," and therefore the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to
review. 9' The court reasoned that the underlying dispute had not been
adjudicated. A meaningful review of an ERISA award requires an adju-
dication of the merits of the dispute. There could be no review by the
appellate court until the district court had decided the ERISA issue.
The Seventh Circuit also held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's charge that the attorney's fees award was insufficient. The at-
torney's fees could not be separated from the merits of the case.92 Ac-
cordingly, that award also required an adjudication of the merits of the
ERISA claim. In Gilles, the district court had not reached a "final deci-
extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms
and conditions of such plan or such agreement.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (1982).
In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary for or on behalf of a plan to enforce
section 1145 of this title in which a judgment in favor of this plan is awarded, the court
shall award the plan-
(A) the unpaid contributions
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions
(C) an amount equal to the greater of-
(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or
(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an amount not in excess
of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as may be permitted under Federal
or State law) of the amount determined by the court under subparagraph(A),
(D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs the action to be paid by the defendant, and,
(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
91. Gilles, 736 F.2d at 1145-46.
92. Id. at 1145. The court recognized that there may be situations in which attorney's fees are
not related to the merits, and can be the subject of an immediate appeal although interlocutory.
However, that was not the situation here. Id.
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sion," and therefore the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review. 93
In another case, the Seventh Circuit determined that it did not have
jurisdiction over an arbitration award that the district court had re-
manded to the arbitrator. In Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc. v. Much, 94 the
arbitrator had determined that Shearson was liable to Much for a sum of
money, but did not state the basis for arriving at that sum. Shearson,
unhappy with the amount of the award, appealed to the district court.
The district court agreed with Shearson that the arbitrator had based the
award on "sheer speculation," 95 and remanded the dispute to the arbitra-
tor for a recalculation of the damages. Instead of returning to the arbi-
trator Shearson appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the district
court's decision to remand. The propriety of an appeal following a re-
mand to an arbitrator depends on the purpose of the remand. Where a
dispute is remanded because what is left to be done is merely "ministerial
action," 96 the appellate court would have jurisdiction. However, in a
case such as this one where the district court's remand will require more
than application of a mandated formula to the numbers, a "final deci-
sion" has not been reached. 97 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit lacked
jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 98
These two cases evidence the Seventh Circuit's strict limitations on
its jurisdiction. In the Gilles case, the court served explicit notice that
appellants be prepared in every appeal to show the basis of the court's
jurisdiction. 99 In Shearson, the court admitted that its dismissal of the
appeal would be expensive to the parties who must return to the arbitra-
tor, and perhaps would come back through the federal courts again.
However, the court acted to discourage appeals when a district court
remands part of a case to the arbitrator. °° Thus, in Shearson, although
93. Id. at 1146.
94. 754 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1985).
95. Id. at 775.
96. Id. at 776. The court defines "ministerial action" as an action applying a mandated formula
to the numbers as opposed to an action which develops the formula. Id. at 776-77.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 778. The Seventh Circuit decision is in accord with the Second Circuit. Stathatos v.
Arnold Bernstein S.S. Corp., 202 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1953). The First Circuit assumed without decid-
ing that an appeal was proper when a district court remanded a dispute over computation of lost
earnings to the original board of arbitrators. Locals 2222, 2320-2327, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 644, 646-47 (1st Cir. 1980). Finally, the Fifth Circuit held
there was appellate jurisdiction when a new hearing was ordered before an arbitration panel. Wells
v. Southern Airways, Inc., 517 F.2d 132, 134 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976).
99. Gilles v. Burton Constr. Co., 736 F.2d 1142, 1147 (7th Cir. 1984).
100. Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc. v. Much, 754 F.2d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 1985).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
judicial economy would be lost, the Seventh Circuit refused to consider a
remand to the arbitrator a "final decision."
However, in another case this term, Mazanec v. North Judson-San
Pierre School Corp., ,01 the Seventh Circuit held a district court's decision
to abstain under the Pullman doctrine to be a "final decision" subject to
immediate review. A Pullman abstention occurs when the court orders
all federal proceedings stayed in order to allow the plaintiff to pursue his
claims in state court. The Seventh Circuit determined that such absten-
tions invoke appellate jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court discussed two types of abstentions in Railroad
Commissioner v. Pullman Co.102 In the first type, the federal court dis-
misses the suit before it and all of the plaintiff's claims are heard in state
court. Since nothing is left for the district court to decide, this type of
dismissal is a "final decision" and always immediately appealable. The
second type of Pullman abstention, on the other hand, is not a dismissal
but a genuine stay. The plaintiff pursues his state claim, but elects to
return to federal court with any federal issues left unresolved after the
state court renders its decision.
In Mazanec, the Seventh Circuit decided to continue its previous
policy of allowing immediate appeals of both types of Pullman absten-
tions. The court based its decision on Seventh Circuit precedent and also
on the recent Supreme Court decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Mercury Construction Corp. 1 03 The Seventh Circuit'04 reasoned
that it is often unclear whether the plaintiff intends to reserve his right to
return to federal court. If he does, the abstention is interlocutory and no
"final decision" was reached. If, however, he elects not to reserve the
right to return, the decision was final. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that basing appellate jurisdiction on the distinction between the two
types of Pullman abstentions is impractical. Accordingly, in the Seventh
101. 750 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984).
102. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
103. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). The Supreme Court decision upholds the appealability of a stay of a
federal suit based on a parallel state proceeding. Such an action would always conclude when the
state court rendered its decision. In contrast, a Pullman abstention is entered with the expectation
that the action will resume in federal court if the plaintiff does not obtain relief for all his claims in
state court. Id. at 10. The Supreme Court, however, refused to distinguish between a Pullman
abstention which is a dismissal and one which is a genuine stay. Id. at 9 n.8. The Seventh Circuit
decided to "stick with the established approach in this circuit" of allowing appeals of all Pullman
abstentions. Mazanec, 750 F.2d at 628.
104. Similarly, the Third Circuit reads Moses as authorizing immediate appeals from stays for
Pullman abstentions. Hovsons, Inc. v. Secretary of Interior, 711 F.2d 1208, 1211 (3d Cir. 1983).
The First and Ninth Circuits hold to the contrary. Bridge Constr. Corp. v. City of Berlin, 705 F.2d
582, 584 (1st Cir. 1983); Badham v. United States Dist. Court, 721 F.2d 1170, 1171-72 (9th Cir.
1983).
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Circuit, an immediate appeal can follow either type of Pullman
abstention. 10 5
2. Injunction Exception
An exception to the "final decision" requirement for appellate juris-
diction provides for interlocutory review of a district court's order grant-
ing or refusing to grant an injunction. 10 6 In South Bend Consumers
Club, Inc. v. United Consumers Club, Inc.,'0 7 the defendant failed in an
attempt to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction based on the district
court's refusal to issue an injunction. The defendant had sought an in-
junction which would prohibit the plaintiff from competing in violation
of a restrictive covenant. The district court refused to issue the injunc-
tion and the defendant appealed.
The Seventh Circuit held that the fact that the district court refused
to issue injunctive relief was insufficient to qualify the ruling as an ap-
pealable interlocutory decree. The would-be appellant must also show
that the refusal to grant the injunction would have "serious, perhaps ir-
reparable consequences" and can only be "effectually challenged" by im-
mediate appeal. 108
The defendant had relied on an earlier Seventh Circuit decision,
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc. 109 for the contention that
the appellate court had jurisdiction over all district interlocutory orders
granting or refusing to grant injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed that the case stood for this, but added that if Data Cash Systems
implied that irreparable consequences need not be shown, it was not
good law. 10 The appellate court has jurisdiction over a district court's
interlocutory order granting or refusing to grant injunctive relief only if
the party seeking review shows irreparable harm requiring immediate
review. I 1
105. Mazanec, 750 F.2d at 628.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982) (in pertinent part):
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ...
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court.
107. 742 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1984).
108. Id. at 393 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)).
109. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
110. South Bend, 742 F.2d at 394. The party seeking the injunction here did not attempt to meet
the burden of showing irreparable harm until asked about it at oral argument. Id.
11. Id. at 393.
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
The Seventh Circuit, in its 1984-85 term, identified the requisite ele-
ments for a district court to grant a preliminary injunction. The Seventh
Circuit changed the standard of appellate review for preliminary injunc-
tions from an "abuse of discretion" standard to a "clear error" standard.
The Seventh Circuit also held that the limitation period for filing a mo-
tion of reconsideration begins when the oral findings are issued, and not
when the written findings are published.
The standards for granting preliminary injunctions, and for appel-
late review of such decisions, were established in Roland v. Dressier.1 2
The case dealt with a dealership agreement between Roland Machinery
and Dressler Industries, whereby Roland sold Dressler's construction
equipment to third parties. The agreement did not contain an exclusive
dealing clause, but did provide that either party could terminate the
agreement without cause on ninety days notice. Several months later,
Dressler learned that Roland had signed a similar agreement with Ko-
matsu, a Japanese competitor of Dressler's. Dressler gave notice that it
would exercise its contractual right to terminate its agreement with Ro-
land. 13 Roland filed suit, charging that Dressler violated Section 3 of
the Clayton Act, and the district court granted Roland's request for a
preliminary injunction based solely on the Section 3 charges.11 4
The Seventh Circuit stated that the following are necessary to grant
a preliminary injunction: 1 5 (1) plaintiff must show that he has "no ade-
quate remedy at law" and that he will suffer "irreparable harm" if the
preliminary injunction is not so granted;" 6 (2) the district court must
consider any irreparable harm that the defendant may suffer from the
injunction;117 (3) the plaintiff must show some likelihood of success on
112. 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
113. Id. at 381.
114. Id.
115. Both sides cited decisions supporting their view of the appropriate appellate standard. Af-
ter identifying numerous and irreconcilable tests to use to determine whether a preliminary injunc-
tion should be granted, the Seventh Circuit decided that since it was not possible to reconcile all of
the distinctions made in previous holdings, the court should announce the standard that the district
courts in the Seventh Circuit should apply. Id. at 382-86.
116. Id. The plaintiff needs to show both an adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm. A
preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy, and an inadequate remedy at law is a requirement for
any form of equitable relief. A preliminary injunction also requires the showing of irreparable harm,
that is, a harm that cannot be rectified by a final judgment. Without such harm, there is no reason
why the moving party cannot wait until the case is tried on the merits.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c) provides in relevant part:
No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon giving of security by
the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs found
to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. The irreparable harm suffered by the non-
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the merits, and the court must determine how likely that success is in
order to balance the extent of harm to both the plaintiff and the defend-
ant;1 8 and (4) the court must also consider any public interest considera-
tions in this balancing process.119
The Seventh Circuit did not state that preservation of the status quo
was a requirement for granting a preliminary injunction. Many previous
holdings had indicated that the purpose of a preliminary injunction was
to preserve the object of controversy: that is, to maintain the status quo
between the two parties until the case was tried on the merits. 120 The
reason the Seventh Circuit gave for not requiring the preservation of the
status quo was that the term "status quo" is ambiguous.1 21 In Roland,
the status quo was preserved to the extent that Roland continued to be a
dealer of Dressler's equipment. But the status quo was also changed, for
the dealership could no longer be terminated by Dressler on ninety days
notice. 122
Perhaps the Seventh Circuit rejected this element too quickly. The
concept behind a preliminary injunction is that the plaintiff cannot be
made whole if he waits for a decision on the merits, and the only ade-
quate remedy is to prevent the defendant from doing what he wants to do
until the case can be tried. This assumes that the plaintiff was whole
before the defendant changed the situation. Therefore, the preservation
of the status quo is necessary to prevent undue benefit for either party.
In Roland, there seems to be an undue benefit. Roland argued that
it would suffer irreparable harm if Dressler was able to terminate the
dealership agreement. 123 But the agreement gave either party the right
to terminate the agreement without cause. It seems illogical that Roland
would suffer irreparable harm when Dressler only exercised a clause of
the contract that both parties had agreed upon. By granting the prelimi-
nary injunction, the district court gave Roland a right it did not have
before the preliminary injunction. This right was the ability to continue
moving party that the court must consider is harm that would not be cured either by the
final judgment or by the injunction bond Rule 65(c) requires.
118. The Seventh Circuit did not state when the plaintiff's likelihood of succeeding on the merits
would be insufficient to grant a preliminary injunction but did say the threshold would be a low one.
See Comment, Probability of Ultimate Success Held Unnecessary for Grant of Preliminary Injunction,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 165 (1971). The Seventh Circuit stated that the district courts should use a
"sliding scale," the greater the harm to the nonmoving party, the greater the likelihood of the plain-
tiff's success on the merits.
119. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1941).
120. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir. 1980); Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, 188 F.2d 302, 306 (7th Cir. 1951).
121. 749 F.2d at 383.
122. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
123. 749 F.2d at 382.
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as a Dressler dealer for more than 90 days. For this reason alone, the
request for a preliminary injunction should have been denied.
The Seventh Circuit had previously held that the standard of appel-
late review for preliminary injunction is abuse of discretion. 124 The Sev-
enth Circuit could have decided Roland based on this standard, but
instead imposed a de novo standard of review. The Seventh Circuit will
now determine if the district court exceeded the bounds its discretion by
reviewing the facts independently, and will not give the district court the
deferential treatment that is customary with the abuse of discretion
standard. 125
The actual effect of this decision on appellate review may not be a
major one. Since the Seventh Circuit reviews the facts anyway to deter-
mine if the district court abused its discretion, it is not a major extension
to review the facts independently to determine if the district court clearly
erred. Previously, if the Seventh Circuit wished to sustain or reverse a
district court's decision, it would determine if the lower court did or did
not abuse its discretion. Now, if the Seventh Circuit wishes to sustain or
reverse a district court's decision, it will determine, based on an in-
dependent review of the facts, if the district court did or did not clearly
err. The net effect could be minimal, but only future holdings will deter-
mine what effect Roland has on preliminary injunctive review.
The dissenting opinion gave four reasons why the Seventh Circuit
should continue to adopt the abuse of discretion standard. First, the
district court is responsible for making a final determination on the mer-
its of the case, so the district court should have discretion to determine
whether the preliminary injunction is necessary to ensure that it will be
able to grant meaningful relief at the end of the trial. 126 Second, the new
standard would result in the substitution of the appellate court's judg-
ment for that of the trial court. 127 Third, the trial court has a greater
knowledge, access to evidence, and "feel" of the case, and so is in a better
position to decide whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate.128 Fi-
nally, the preliminary injunction is often granted or denied based on an
abbreviated hearing. In such a hearing, the parties have not developed
124. See Menominee Rubber Co. v. Gould, Inc., 657 F.2d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1981); Reinders
Bros. Inc. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 49 (7th Cir. 1980); Milsen Co. v. Southland
Corp., 454 F.2d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 1971); see also 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, 2962 at 633 (1973).
125. 749 F.2d at 391.
126. Id. at 396.
127. See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 778-80
(1957).
128. Id. at 781-82.
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their arguments nor created the record which is so important for the
appellate court. 129 Finding that the district court did not err or abuse its
discretion, the dissent would have affirmed the lower court's decision. 130
In Financial Services Corp. v. Weindruch,13 1 the Seventh Circuit de-
termined when the limitation period for appealing a preliminary injunc-
tion begins. On June 16, 1983, the district court concluded the hearing
on the preliminary injunction motion, and issued oral findings of fact and
conclusions of law. On June 23, the preliminary injunction was issued,
and on June 30 the written findings of fact were issued.' 32 On July 11,
the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, and on November 11,
filed their notice of appeal.
The defendants argued that the motion for reconsideration tolled
the thirty-day limitation period for appealing a private action.133 How-
ever, such a motion must be filed within ten days of the judgment accord-
ing to the Federal Rules. '34 The Seventh Circuit determined that the
judgment occurred on June 23, when the preliminary injunction was
orally issued, and therefore the motion for reconsideration was time-
barred by the ten-day limitation period. The Rules do not allow a party
who is dissatisfied with the oral judgment to wait until the written judg-
ment is issued before he files his motion for reconsideration. The Seventh
Circuit stated that such a wait may be allowed if the motion concerned a
finding added to the written judgment after the oral judgment was is-
sued, 135 but that was not the situation in Weindruch. The Rule states ten
days from judgment, and the Seventh Circuit has conservatively inter-
preted the Rule to mean ten days from the first notice of the oral
judgment.
INTERPLEADER JURISDICTION
Interpleader jurisdiction requires that there be two or more adverse
claimants to the same stake.' 36 The stake can be money, property, or
129. 749 F.2d at 397.
130. Id. at 402.
131. 764 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 198.
133. The Seventh Circuit has held that a motion to alter or amend judgment, based on FED. R.
Civ. P. 59(e), will toll the thirty-day limitation period for filing an appeal, and a motion to recon-
sider is a motion to alter or amend under FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See A.D. Weiss Lithographic Co. v.
Illinois Adhesive Prod. Co., 705 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
134. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(b) provides in relevant part:
Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the court may
amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly.
The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.
135. 764 F.2d at 198.
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 22 provides in relevant part:
CIVIL PROCEDURE
both. 1 7 The previous trend in both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme
Court has been to liberally construe this requirement. 138 However, the
Seventh Circuit deviated from this liberal construction in its 1984-85
term.
The 1984-85 decision indicating this deviation was Indianapolis
Colts v. Baltimore.'3 9 In Indianapolis Colts, the Colts, a professional
football team, had signed a lease with C.I.B., 140 the operators of the Hoo-
sier Dome in Indianapolis, to play all their games in Indianapolis. They
had previously played all their games in Baltimore, and the Maryland
Senate had already passed a bill authorizing the City of Baltimore to
acquire the Colts by eminent domain. The City of Baltimore began con-
demnation proceedings in Maryland State Court, which the Colts had
removed to a federal district court in Maryland. The Colts then filed an
action seeking a restraining order in the Federal District Court for the
District of Southern Indiana, based on interpleader jurisdiction, claiming
that the Colts' obligation under their lease with C.I.B. conflicted with
Baltimore's attempt to acquire the team through eminent domain. The
district court granted the Colts' request for a restraining order, and Balti-
more appealed. ' 4 '
On appeal, Baltimore contended that there was no proper inter-
pleader jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit agreed, vacated the order of
the district court, and remanded the action with instructions to dis-
miss. 14 2 The first reason the Seventh Circuit held there was no jurisdic-
tion was because Baltimore and the C.I.B. did not have conflicting claims
to the same stake. Baltimore's claim was for ownership of the team,
while the C.I.B. claim was only a lease agreement that the Colts play in
Indiana. Although the lease gave C.I.B. the right to choose the new
owner of the team should the present owner decide to sell,14" this right
(1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required
to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or
multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims of the several
claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not have a common origin, or are
not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers
that he is not liable in whole or in part to all of the claimants.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 provides in relevant part: "(a) The district court shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person,
firm or corporation, association or society having in his custody or possession money or property of
$500 or more .. "
138. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 (1967); Union Cent. Life
Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Steel Prods., Inc., 448 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1971).
139. 741 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1753 (1985).
140. Capital Improvement Board of Managers of Marion County, Indiana (C.I.B.).
141. 741 F.2d at 956.
142. Id. at 958.
143. Id. at 956.
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did not create a present property interest that would conflict with Balti-
more's present property right to purchase the Colts by eminent domain.
This reasoning is inconsistent with previous holdings that the fed-
eral interpleader statute be liberally construed. 144 A liberal construction
of the word "stake" was taken by the dissent.1 45 The dissent considered
the "stake" in this action to be more than the ownership of a property
interest; it was the right to have a National Football League franchise,
with all the attending social and economic benefits that a major city
could derive from having such a franchise. Since both C.I.B. and Balti-
more wanted this right, they were both claiming the same stake.
A California Supreme Court holding supports the dissent's interpre-
tation of the property involved in an eminent domain action when pro-
curing a professional football franchise. In City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders,1 46 the city of Oakland brought an eminent domain action to
acquire all the property rights associated with the Oakland Raiders foot-
ball team. The California Supreme Court held that such an action could
be brought, because the California eminent domain statute allowed for
the purchase of property "for public use." 147  Stadiums could be
purchased for public use under this statute,148 and the California
Supreme Court found no substantial legal distinction between managing
and owning a stadium and managing and owning the team that plays in
the stadium. 149 The Seventh Circuit held to the contrary; there was such
a legal distinction, and this distinction prevented the two claims from
being interplead.
There was a second reason the Seventh Circuit held there was no
interpleader jurisdiction. The Court held that the Colts had no real or
reasonable fear of double liability.1 50 A provision of the C.I.B. lease
agreement stipulated that the Colts could terminate the lease at their op-
tion without further obligation should the Colts be acquired by eminent
144. See supra note 106.
145. 741 F.2d at 960-61.
146. 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
147. 32 Cal. 3d at 69, 646 P.2d at 841, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
148. Anaheim v. Michel, 259 Cal. App. 2d 835, 837, 66 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (1968). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has held that anything which related to "activities which promote recreation of
the public constitute a public purpose." County of Alameda v. Meadowlark Dairy Corp., 227 Cal.
App. 2d 80, 85, 38 Cal. Rptr. 474, 477 (1964). See also Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d
423, 434, 333 P.2d 745, 753 (1959) (acquisition of land for a baseball field considered an obvious
public purpose); Egan v. San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576, 582, 133 P. 294, 296 (1913) ("generally speak-
ing, anything calculated to promote the education, the recreation, or the pleasure of the public is to
be included within the legitimate domain of public purpose.")
149. 32 Cal. 3d at 73, 646 P.2d at 842, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
150. 741 F.2d at 957.
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domain.' Since this "escape clause" eliminated any fear of double lia-
bility the Colts might have, there was no basis for federal interpleader
jurisdiction.
This reasoning is inconsistent with Seventh Circuit precedent set in
the 1970-71 term. In Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Hamilton Steel
Products, Inc.,15 2 an insurance company brought an interpleader action
seeking a declaration of rights of various parties under a group annuity
insurance policy issued to the bankrupt defendant. Two classes of em-
ployees contended that the trustee and the union representatives were not
proper parties and should not be allowed to interplead. The Seventh Cir-
cuit disagreed, holding that the purpose of interpleader was two-fold:
one purpose being to protect the stakeholder from the expense of double
litigation, no matter how groundless the claims were, and the other pur-
pose being to protect the stakeholder from double liability.' 53
In Indianapolis Colts, the Seventh Circuit did not consider affirming
the interpleader jurisdiction in order to save the stakeholder the expense
of double litigation. The Seventh Circuit felt that there was no possibility
that the Colts would incur such an expense, even though such a possibil-
ity did exist.
The "escape clause" only allowed the Colts to terminate the lease
contract if a court of final appellate jurisdiction approved the eminent
domain action. Any restraining order from a lower court preventing the
Colts from playing in Indiana would enable C.I.B. to sue for damages,
giving rise to double litigation. This failure to consider the stakeholder's
expense of double litigation as a justification for interpleader jurisdiction
represents a major change in the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the
purpose of interpleader jurisdiction.
Another change occurred when the Seventh Circuit in Indianapolis
Colts held that the C.I.B. claim was unreasonable and non-meritori-
ous.' 54 This is also inconsistent with Seventh Circuit precedent. Union
Central Life held that interpleader jurisdiction was not dependent on the
merits of the claims of the interpled parties.' 55 Instead, the underlying
151. Clause 21.6(a)(ii) of the C.I.B. lease provides in relevant part:
iii) If Club (Colts) is ordered by a final order of such court of final appellate jurisdiction
to play other than at the Stadium (Hoosier Dome) or the Franchise is acquired by eminent
domain, this Agreement shall terminate at Club's option, and the Parties shall have no
further obligations hereunder.
741 F.2d at 958.
152. 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1758 (1985).
153. Id. at 504.
154. 741 F.2d at 958.
155. 448 F.2d at 504. See also Bierman v. Marcus, 246 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied
sub nor. Milmar Estate, Inc. v. Marcus, 356 U.S. 933 (1958).
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purpose of interpleader is to have one court decide the merits of each
claim based on the proceedings. It defeats the purpose of interpleader to
decide these merits prior to the proceedings, especially when the alleg-
edly non-meritorious claim had succeeded in the district court. 56 Inter-
pleader jurisdiction should not be denied unless the non-meritorious
claim fails to pass a "minimum test of substantiality."1 5 7
The Seventh Circuit relied on two cases to support its decision that
the C.I.B. claim failed to pass this test. In Francis I. Dupont & Co. v.
O'Keefe,158 the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The
district court held that only one of the claims had merit. In Bierman v.
Marcus,159 the Third Circuit denied interpleader jurisdiction because one
of the adverse claimants solely owned and controlled the stakeholder.
The Third Circuit held there was no interpleader jurisdiction because the
stakeholder knew that the corporation had no meritorious claim on the
stake.
Neither of these two situations existed in Indianapolis Colts. This
case is distinguishable from Union Central Life and O'Keefe because the
Seventh Circuit found a claim non-meritorious after the district court
held that the claim had merit. Nor does the Third Circuit's rationale in
Bierman apply to Indianapolis Colts. The Colts had no specific knowl-
edge that the C.I.B. claim was non-meritorious, like the stakeholder in
Bierman. 16 0
In sum, the lack of fear of double liability is now sufficient to deny
interpleader jurisdiction in the Seventh Circuit. The court no longer con-
siders the element of the stakeholder's expense of double litigation. This
decision indicated the Seventh Circuit's willingness to examine the merits
of each claim before allowing interpleader jurisdiction. Other circuits
liberally construe the interpleader statute to allow the merits of the
claims to be determined based on the proceedings.
FEES AND SANCTIONS
During the 1984-1985 term, the Seventh Circuit considered various
rules when imposing sanctions and attorney's fees. In this term, the
court lessened the standard for imposing sanctions against attorneys.
The court was also more willing to award prevailing plaintiffs their attor-
156. Id.
157. See Francis I. DuPont & Co. v. O'Keefe, 365 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1966).
158. 365 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1966).
159. 246 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1957) cert. denied sub nom. Milmer Estate, Inc. v. Marcus, 356 U.S.
933 (1958).
160. Id. at 203.
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ney's fees than in previous terms. However, the Seventh Circuit did not
lessen the standard for awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants.
The court's readiness to impose sanctions or award attorney's fees may
indicate that it is becoming aware of the need to regulate the actions of
attorneys and their clients in the federal judiciary.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
1. Civil Rights Cases
The Seventh Circuit considered the award of attorney's fees to a
prevailing party, other than the United States, under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.161 To award attorney's fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988, the action must be filed as a civil rights suit.162 This
section allows a court to grant a prevailing party in a civil rights suit his
attorney's fees. 163 Case law, however, distinguishes between a prevailing
plaintiff and prevailing defendant. 164 The standard for a prevailing plain-
tiff is simply that he is the prevailing party whereas the prevailing defend-
ant must prove that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous. 165
The different standards for an award of attorney's fees was discussed
in Hermes v. Hein. 166 In Hermes, the plaintiffs appealed the district
court decision granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment
and awarding the defendants over $89,000 in attorney's fees. The plain-
tiffs filed this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 alleging that the
President of the Village of Wheeling, the Commissioners, and the Village
of Wheeling falsified the results of the competitive examinations used to
promote police officers to the rank of lieutenant or sergeant. The plain-
tiffs maintained that the falsifying of test results violated their first
amendment right and their due process right to promotion. As a result,
the plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and § 1985.167
In November of 1979, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' due
process claim with leave to amend stating that the plaintiffs did not allege
a sufficient basis to find that they had a property interest in the promo-
tion for purposes of due process. After plaintiffs amended their com-
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
§§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1986... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of his costs."
162. A civil rights suit is a claim filed under Title 42.
163. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
164. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
165. Id. at 416-17, 421-22.
166. Hermes v. Hein, 742 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1984).
167. Id. at 352.
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plaint, the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint finding that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient
to establish a due process property interest in the promotion. 168
After two years of discovery, the district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiffs failed
to raise any issue of material fact or provide any factual support for their
claims of political discrimination or their due process claim. In May of
1983, the district court awarded the defendants $87,326.50 in attorney's
fees and $2,344.65 in costs. 169 The plaintiffs appealed this award main-
taining that their action was neither frivolous nor lacking factual sup-
port. Although the Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in granting defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, it did find that the lower court's award of attorney's fees was an
abuse of its discretion. The court based its result on both its interpreta-
tion of § 1988 and recent case law. 170
First, the Seventh Circuit explained that § 1988 is used in cases filed
under § 1983 and § 1985.171 Second, the court noted that § 1988 allows
a "prevailing party" to receive attorney's fees. 172 The court stated that
according to Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,173 a prevailing de-
fendant will receive attorney's fees only if the plaintiff's claim was "frivo-
lous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to
litigate after it clearly became so.'174 The court went on to note that
according to the Christiansburg court, subjective bad faith is not neces-
sary for an award of attorney's fees. This does not mean, however, that
an ultimately unsuccessful claim is unreasonable. 175
In addition, the Hermes court looked to Ekanem v. Health and Hos-
pital Corp. ,176 a recent Seventh Circuit case which considered a similar
issue. In Ekanem, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Christiansburg ra-
tionale regarding the possibility of the plaintiffs not knowing if they
would succeed on the merits of the case. In addition, the Ekanem court
held that the nature of the case should be considered since some type of
claims require that the plaintiff be given wide latitude in attempting to
prove his case. 1
77
168. Id.
169. Id. at 352-53.
170. Id. at 353-58.
171. Id. at 356.
172. Id.
173. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
174. Id. at 421-22.
175. Hermes, 742 F.2d at 356. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22.
176. 724 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
177. Id. at 575.
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The Seventh Circuit employed in Hermes the principles set forth in
Ekanem and Christiansburg to determine whether a claim was meritless.
First, the Seventh Circuit stated that the district court must consider the
type of evidence to be presented along with the factual uncertainty of the
outcome of the litigation. The court reasoned that even though the
plaintiff's factual evidence would not survive a motion for summary
judgment, it was sufficient to state a cause of action. As such, any factual
uncertainty as to the outcome of the litigation should not render the
plaintiff's claim meritless.
Second, consideration must be given to the plaintiff to establish evi-
dence which may indicate that his claim is not meritless. Furthermore,
this evidence should be considered by a court in determining whether a
plaintiff's claims are groundless. In Hermes, the Seventh Circuit found
that plaintiff's specific information which was the foundation of his claim
was not considered by the district court when it held that the plaintiff's
claim was frivolous. This two part rule is in keeping with recent Seventh
Circuit decisions regarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.178
The Hermes court went on to consider when a plaintiff's claim may
warrant granting defendant his attorney's fees. The court enunciated a
test which would supposedly aid courts in determining at what point
during the litigation a plaintiff's claim would warrant such harsh treat-
ment. This test requires that the district court make an assessment of the
conduct of the parties at the various stages of litigation. 179 Such a test is
somewhat vague and does not enhance a district court's discretion. Fur-
thermore, the Seventh Circuit's suggestions that a trial court review and
note any lack of progress on a pending case does not give the district
court much guidance in determining when a claim may become frivo-
lous. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hermes does not
make clear when 42 U.S.C. § 1988 can be utilized in determining when
to award attorney's fees. In fact, the Hermes decision may make the area
more confusing.
The second section of Title VII which the Seventh Circuit consid-
ered was 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). °80 Like section 1988, the language of
178. Hermes, 742 F.2d at 357. See Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 724 F.2d 563 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984); Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.
1983).
179. Hermes, 742 F.2d at 358.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
The award of attorney's fees under § 2000e-5(k) are applicable only to prevailing parties and cannot
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section 2000e-5(k) indicates that attorney's fees can be awarded to a pre-
vailing party. Case law, however, dictates that this award shall only be
granted to a prevailing plaintiff unless the plaintiff's action was frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation.18 The decision to award attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) is usually within the court's discretion.
The award of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff is usually done for
one of two reasons. First, a Title VII plaintiff was chosen by Congress as
an example of the consequences when civil rights laws are enforced. Sec-
ond, such an award is made against a violator of federal law.' 82  The
award of attorney's fees is given to a prevailing defendant only if the
plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. 183
In Eichman v. Linden & Sons, Inc., ' 84 the Seventh Circuit consid-
ered the application of the award provision under section 2000e-5(k).
Mr. Eichman filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. alleging that he
was discriminated against by his employer who replaced him with a
younger female. During discovery, the Illinois Human Rights Commis-
sion found that Mr. Eichman's allegations were false. 185 Two years later,
Mr. Eichman moved for a Rule 42(a)(2) dismissal. The district court
granted the dismissal but it did not award the defendant his attorney's
fees. The court reasoned that Eichman's allegations were not
frivolous. 86
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that a prevailing defendant
can recover his attorney's fees only if the plaintiff's claims are "frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.' 87 The court found that this stan-
dard will ensure that meritless claims are filed while deterring frivolous
lawsuits. The Seventh Circuit did not find Eichman's claim to be frivo-
lous since the EEOC's finding that the plaintiff's claim was false was not
based upon a detailed inspection. 88 Because a full scale inspection was
not completed when the Commission issued its finding, the court chose
be imposed against an attorney. 28 U.S.C. § 1927, on the other hand, specifically allows a court to
order counsel to pay excess costs caused by his vexatious behavior and multiplication of the proceed-
ing. Because the two statutes differ in both their scope and purpose, they are applicable to different
situations.
181. Eichman v. Linden & Sons, Inc., 752 F.2d at 1248 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978)).
182. Id. at 1248. See also Glass v. Pfeiffer, 657 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1981).
183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
184. 752 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1985).
185. Id. at 1247.
186. Id. at 1248.
187. Id. (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22).
188. Eichman, 752 F.2d at 1249. The court found that this investigation must be completed
within 120 days. As a result, the investigation may not consider all of the factors of each case. The
Eichman court chose not to give great weight to the Commissioner's findings. Id.
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not to find Mr. Eichman's claim irrelevant and thereby affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding denying the defendant his attorney's fees.'8 9
Thus, a prevailing party is usually allowed to recover his attorney's
fees under Title VII. The provisions of Title VII differentiate between a
prevailing defendant and a prevailing plaintiff. The burden of proving
reimbursement under section 2000e-5(k) is much greater for a defendant
than for a plaintiff.
2. Rule 41(a)(2)
The Seventh Circuit also considered Rule 41(a)(2)190 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure when awarding attorney's fees to the defendant.
Unlike other rules, the plaintiff's claim need not be frivolous for the de-
fendant to be awarded his attorney's fees. 19 1 Instead, if the plaintiff is
granted a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the court has the discre-
tion to award the defendant his attorney's fees. ' 92 The courts base their
discretion on the phrase "upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper." 193 Most circuits, however, are in conflict as to whether a
Rule 41(a)(2) judgment is appealable. This issue was one of first impres-
sion in the Seventh Circuit in its 1984-85 term.
In Cauley v. Wilson, 194 the Seventh Circuit considered two issues
regarding Rule 41(a)(2). First, the court considered whether a Rule
41(a)(2) judgment is final and therefore appealable. Second, the court
looked to whether a defendant may be awarded his costs under Rule
41(a)(2). In determining the appealability of a Rule 41(a)(2) judgment,
the court considered both the majority and the minority approaches. 95
The majority of circuits hold that a Rule 41 (a)(2) judgment may be
appealed only if the conditions of the dismissal "legally prejudice" the
plaintiff.' 96 The minority approach allows an appeal of a Rule 41(a)(2)
189. Id. at 1251.
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) provides:
By order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon an order of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon his or the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in
the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
191. For example 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires that plaintiff's claim be frivolous before granting a
prevailing defendant his attorney's fees.
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
193. Id.
194. 754 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1985).
195. Id at 770-71.
196. See Bowers v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 668 F.2d 369, 370 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 946 (1982) (the Eighth Circuit did not find the lower court's restriction that the
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dismissal only if the court is to review whether the district court abused
its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. 197 In Cauley, the Seventh Cir-
cuit chose to follow the minority approach. 198 The court reasoned that
although a plaintiff may understand that implicit in a Rule 41(a)(2) dis-
missal is his agreement to pay the defendant's legal fees, this understand-
ing is not equivalent to an approval on whatever sanctions the court may
choose. The Seventh Circuit correctly reasoned that an unusually large
award of attorney's fees may constitute an involuntary adverse judgment.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit chose only to review the lower court's discre-
tion in awarding attorney's fees. 199
In considering the plaintiff's argument that the fees were not a
"term or condition" of the dismissal, the court noted that the defendant
requested attorney's fees at the same hearing that the district court
granted the plaintiff its Rule 41(a)(2) motion. The court stated that if the
plaintiff objected to the amount granted to the defendant, his attorney
should have voiced the objection when the motion was granted. The Sev-
enth Circuit found that the attorney should have known that fees are an
implicit condition of the Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal. 200
The Cauley court also considered the reasonableness of the lower
court's award. The court first discussed that the purpose of awarding
attorney's fees with a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal is to compensate the de-
fendant for any unnecessary expenses incurred in the litigation.20  The
court found that this reimbursement, however, should only apply to rea-
sonable expenses, i.e. the expenses incurred for preparation which cannot
be utilized in a subsequent trial.20 2 Because the district court did not
state why it found an award of $7,500 to be a reasonable term and condi-
plaintiff could only appeal the case in Arkansas or federal court to "legally prejudice" or "severely
circumscribe" the plaintiff to reinitiate the suit); Scholl v. Felmont Oil Corp., 327 F.2d 697, 700 (6th
Cir. 1964) (the court held that the lower court's requirement that the plaintiff pay the defendant's
attorney's fees was neither unreasonable nor an involuntary adverse judgment and thus not
appealable.)
197. Cauley, 754 F.2d at 771. See GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364, 367-68
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (the court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in awarding those
attorney's fees which were incurred by the defendant in defending this action as a "term or condi-
tion" of Rule 41(a)(2).
198. 754 F.2d at 771. The court limited the situations when it would follow the minority ap-
proach to those when a plaintiff requests a dismissal in order to proceed in a state court.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 771. Although the Seventh Circuit did not support this condition, other circuits have
ruled in the same manner. See GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Scholl v. Felmont Oil Corp., 327 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1964).
201. Id. at 772.
202. Id. See GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364, 369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Le-
Compte v. Mr. Chip Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1976); Yoffe v. Keller Indus. Inc., 580 F.2d
126 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979).
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tion of Rule 41(a)(2), the Seventh Circuit remanded the case so that rea-
sonable attorney's fees could be determined. 20 3 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit followed the minority position regarding the appealability of Rule
41(a)(2), while following the majority opinion in determining that a Rule
41 (a)(2) judgment has an implicit condition that requires the plaintiff to
pay the defendant his attorney's fees.
SANCTIONS
In its 1984-1985 term, the Seventh Circuit employed two rules of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that impose sanctions on attorneys
and their clients who abuse the judicial process. Rules 38204 and 46(c) 20 5
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide methods by which a
court of appeals can impose sanctions upon an attorney for his personal
conduct or upon litigants for their disregard of the judicial system and its
rules.
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for
two types of sanctions against an appellant. First, it allows a circuit
court to request the appellant to pay the opposing counsel's "just dam-
ages" and single costs. 20 6 Usually, singles costs are imposed against a
party whose actions are either frivolous or meritless. Second, Fed. R.
App. P. 38 allows a court to require that the appellant pay just damages
and double costs to the appellee.20 7 Generally, double costs will be
awarded if an appellant's actions, or those of his attorney, go beyond
frivolousness. In both cases, single or double costs can be imposed
against both the appellant and his attorney. Although Fed. R. App. P.
38 does not specifically provide for attorney's fees, courts have inter-
preted the damages provision to include reasonable attorney's fees.208 In
the 1984-85 term, the Seventh Circuit considered the issue of imposing
Fed. R. App. P. 38 sanctions against an Indiana attorney.
In Lepucki v. Van Wormer, Pazdur v. Blaw-Know Foundry and Mill
Machinery,20 9 the court imposed sanctions on the plaintiff's attorney Mr.
203. Cauley, 754 F.2d at 772-73. The district court did not award the defendant the $14,500
that he requested. Id. at 772.
204. FED. R. App. P. 38 provides: "If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is
frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee."
205. Id.
206. Id. The term "just damages" seems to be used by the court as a term of art though the
court did not define it.
207. See infra notes 225-229 and accompanying text.
208. See Cummings v. United States, 648 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1981); Werch v. City of Berlin,
673 F.2d 192, 196 (7th Cir. 1982).
209. 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 6 (1985). Two appeals were
consolidated into one opinion since both cases involved the same attorney.
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John Hyde for continuously filing frivolous or vexatious claims. In
Lepucki, the plaintiff claimed that he was exempt from withholding taxes
when he filed his W-4 form with his employer Inland Steel. After investi-
gating the claim, the Internal Revenue Service ordered Inland to resume
withholding taxes from the plaintiff's checks. This information was
given to the plaintiff, Mr. Lepucki, by a supervisor of Inland Steel Co.,
Richard Smulevitz, who also informed Mr. Lepucki about the penalty
imposed on him for submitting false information to the IRS. Mr.
Smulevitz also informed the plaintiff that this penalty was to be deducted
from his wages. 210 The plaintiff then retained Mr. Hyde who filed a com-
plaint in Indiana state court alleging that both the IRS officials and Mr.
Smulevitz defamed the plaintiff when they accused him of submitting
false information on his W-4 form. The claim also alleged that both de-
fendants wrongfully withheld the plaintiff's wages. 211
The defendants removed this action to the federal district court
where the defamation action was dismissed against the IRS officials and
Mr. Smulevitz. The district court also dismissed the claim for wrong-
fully withheld wages. After dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims, the
district court imposed defendants' costs and fees against the plaintiff Mr.
Lepucki and his attorney Mr. Hyde because the action was not instituted
in good faith. Instead, the district court found that this action was a
device by which plaintiff's attorney could discuss his beliefs and opinions
regarding the tax laws of the United States of America. 212
In considering this appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded costs and fees to the
defendants. The court found that plaintiff's suit was frivolous and his
appeal consisted solely of Mr. Hyde's opinion concerning the "evils of
federal reserve notes." The court also stated that this action was brought
in bad faith. 213 The Seventh Circuit, however, did not distinguish be-
tween the standard of frivolousness and that of bad faith. Instead, it used
the two standards interchangeably when imposing single costs against a
party or an attorney. 214
In Pazdur v. Blaw-Know Foundry and Mill Machinary,21 5 Mr. Hyde
once again represented plaintiffs who sought a return of their withheld
wages and an injunction barring federal notes. After removing the case
210. Id. at 88.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 89.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 87.
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to federal district court, the defendants moved to dismiss the action and
claimed costs and fees. Because the plaintiffs failed to respond within the
extension of time granted to them, the district court dismissed the com-
plaint with prejudice. At a hearing on the motion to award fees and
costs, Mr. Hyde's clients appeared without him. Because Mr. Hyde
failed to appear in court to represent his clients, fees and costs were im-
posed against him and the six party plaintiffs. 216
Only Mr. Hyde appealed the judgment assessing $2,139.97 in costs
against him. Mr. Hyde argued that because " 'there are no dollars and a
court can enter judgment only in dollars, no court can enter a valid judg-
ment for money today.' ",217 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument
finding it to be a meritless and outrageous contention. The court
awarded single costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Fed. R.
App. P. 38, against Mr. Hyde as the appellant. Furthermore, the Sev-
enth Circuit planned to refer Mr. Hyde to state disciplinary bodies so
that they may conduct an investigation of his abuse of the judicial
process. 218
In imposing such sanctions, the Seventh Circuit discussed the fact
that frivolous or vexatious claims thwart the purpose and the need of
judicial economy. The court also stated that attorneys will be held to the
minimum standard of professional responsibility. 219 Although the court
did not explain the requirements of the standard, the court correctly
stated the consequences when the standard is not met. First, the court
noted that failure to meet this standard exhibits disdain for the public
whose meritorious claims lie dormant since judicial resources have been
exhausted by frivolous claims. Second, the court also stated that such
frivolous claims exhibit disdain for adversaries and clients who must ex-
pend time and funds to litigate such frivolous claims. 220
Fed. R. App. P. 38 also allows a court to award double costs to the
appellee. 221 This application of the rule was considered in Gilles v. Burton
Construction Co.,222 where the plaintiffs attempted to appeal a non-ap-
pealable order. The court found this appeal to be frivolous under Fed. R.
App. P. 38 for two reasons. First, the court noted that the judgment was
not yet final and therefore not appealable. Second, the court found that
the plaintiffs did not attempt to justify their claim concerning the court's
216. Id.
217. Id. at 88.
218. Id. at 89.
219. Id. at 87.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
222. 736 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1984).
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jurisdiction. 223 The court did not, however, award attorney's fees and
double costs because the bad faith requirement of Fed. R. App. P. 38 was
not fulfilled. The court reasoned that even though the appeal was prema-
ture, the plaintiff's substantive arguments were not frivolous. Conse-
quently, double costs and attorney's fees were not awarded under Fed. R.
App. P. 38.224
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Reid v. United
States225 where the Seventh Circuit set forth a two part test which must
be met before Fed. R. App. P. 38 sanctions may be imposed. 226 The Reid
court noted that it is less difficult to impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 since that provision requires only that a party create needless de-
lay.227 The two requirements of the Reid test are: a) the appeal must be
frivolous;228 and b) the appellant must have instituted the appeal in bad
faith with no reasonable expectation that the district court's judgment
would be changed and with intent to delay the proceedings or harass the
appellee. 229 When the court applied this two part test to the facts of
Gilles,230 it found that although the appeal was frivolous, the appellants
did not institute the appeal in bad faith. Instead, the court stated that the
appellants arguments on the merits of the case were justifiable. Further-
more, the court found that the appellants did not want to merely delay or
harass the appellees since they would not gain anything by doing so.231
Hence, because the two part test set forth in Reid was not met, the Gilles
court refused to impose Fed. R. App. P. 38 sanctions of double costs
against the appellants. 232
The Seventh Circuit's application of Fed. R. App. P. 38 is in keeping
with other circuits. For example, the Ninth Circuit, 233 the Fourth Cir-
223. Id. at 1145-46.
224. Id. at 1146-47.
225. 715 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1983).
226. Id. at 1154-55.
227. Id. at 1154.
228. Id. The Reid court found that this first portion of the two part test would not be fulfilled if
the appeal was merely unsuccessful. An example of a frivolous appeal is one in which controlling
precedents indicate that the appellant does not have a justifiable basis for the appeal. Id.
229. Id. at 1155. By appealing a claim in bad faith, the case becomes one in which an imposition
of sanctions would be appropriate. Not only must there be no reasonable expectation of altering the
district court's judgment, but the appellant must intend to delay or harass the appellee. The actions
of both the appellant and his attorney shall be considered.
230. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
231. 736 F.2d at 1146-47.
232. Id.
233. Alhambra Foundry Co. Ltd v. General Warehousemen's Union, Local 598, 687 F.2d 287,
290 (9th Cir. 1982) (the court found that the appeal was not frivolous as required by FED. R. APP. P.
38 and thus sanctions were not imposed).
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CUit,234 the Fifth Circuit,23 5 and the Sixth Circuit 236 all look to whether
the appeal was frivolous before awarding single costs and attorney's fees
as damages. The Ninth Circuit 237 and the Fifth Circuit 238 also follow a
two part test when imposing double costs on the appellant. Application
of Fed. R. App. P. 38 is seemingly uniform throughout the circuits.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit reviewed a variety of decisions involving issues
of civil procedure in its 1984-85 term. This review indicated a tendency
by the court to closely examine the individual facts and merits of each
case. The Seventh Circuit no longer seems satisfied with a mere deferral
to the discretionary decisions of the district courts. Instead, the court is
more willing to make an independent judgment in applying the appropri-
ate law.
This willingness has been shown in such areas as personal jurisdic-
tion, preliminary injunction, interpleader jurisdiction, attorney's fees,
sanctions, removal and appellate jurisdiction. For example, in Indianap-
olis Colts, while the district court used its discretion in deciding that ju-
risdiction did exist, the Seventh Circuit reversed based on a stricter
application of the requirements of such jurisdiction. Similarly, in Her-
mes, the court found that the district court abused its discretion in
awarding attorney's fees because the district court did not correctly ap-
ply the appropriate standard. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are specific, if the district court misapplies the Rule by using an
inappropriate standard, the Seventh Circuit, in 1984-85, was willing to
reverse, holding that the district court abused its discretion.
234. Harman v. Pauley, 678 F.2d 479, 482 n.3 (4th Cir. 1982) (the court found that appellant's
appeal was not frivolous so as to require FED. R. App. P. 38 damages or attorney's fees).
235. Campbell v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 714 F. 2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1983) (the court
held that sanctions would not be imposed against the appellant since the appeal was not patently
frivolous or without any reasonable basis).
236. TIF Instruments, Inc., v. Colette, 713 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1983) (the court found that
because the appellant's position regarding discovery was frivolous, justifiable costs and attorney's
fees were awarded).
237. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 735 F.2d 346, 350 (9th Cir. 1984) (the court
held that the first part of the two part FED. R. App. P. 38 test requiring a frivolous appeal was not
fulfilled).
238. Pegues v. Morehouse Parish School Bd., 706 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1983) (the court held that
the second requirement of the two part FED. R. App. P. 38 test that a case be appropriate for the
award of double costs and attorney's fees was not fulfilled since the appeal was not patently frivo-
lous); Ratcliff v. Texas, 714 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1983) (the court held that double costs would be
imposed upon an appellant if the purpose of the appeal was to harass the appellee).

